United States V. JACKSON


United States v. Jackson, 368 F.3d 59 (2d Cir.2004).

Defendant was convicted of illegal possession of firearms by a convicted felon. At trial the government presented a certified copy of judgment that showed that a person by the same name as defendant was convicted of a firearm offense in 1984. The government offered no further evidence.

Held: The jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the person convicted of the firearm offense in 1984 was the same person as defendant simply because they shared the same common name.

Table of Contents



After a trial conducted on November 5 and November 6, the state found defendant, Aron Jackson, guilty of possession of ammunition by a previously convicted felon. During Jackson’s trial, Special Agent Matthew White of the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (the “ATF”) testified for the state.

He testified that, in carrying out his duties, which included investigating illegal possession of firearms by convicted felons, he and other agents of the ATF went to Jackson’s apartment in the Bronx. They asked Jackson whether he had any firearms or ammunition. And Jackson showed them a safe containing a quantity of ammunition.The agents seized the ammunition.

To prove that Jackson was a previously convicted felon, the government offered a certified copy of a judgment of the New York Supreme Court for New York County showing that on January 11, 1984, a person named Aaron Jackson was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon and of a controlled substance. The government offered no further evidence connecting Jackson to the 1984 conviction. Jackson neither testified nor called witnesses in his defense. On summation, he argued for the first time that the government had failed to prove that the Aaron Jackson named in the certificate of conviction from 1984 might be someone other than the Jackson on trial. The jury found Jackson guilty.

And Jackson appealed his conviction.


Whether the fact-finder, given the evidence presented at trial of a 1984 conviction record of a person named Aaron Jackson, could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt from that evidence alone that the 1984 conviction was of the defendant, Aaron L. Jackson.


The test for determining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence asks whether a “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” The evidence, in other words, must be of such persuasive quality that a jury could reasonably find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of that evidence.


Here, the court found that the fact finder could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the person convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon and of a controlled substance in 1984 was the same person on trial for the current offense.

Here is how the court explained its position:

The name Jackson is quite common, and the first name Aaron, which is of biblical origin, is also quite common.

A conclusion cannot be reached with sufficient confidence to satisfy the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard that two separate episodes involving persons of similar features relate to the same person unless the similarities are sufficiently distinctive to make it highly improbable that the two observed persons could be other than the same. Thus, where two separately observed individuals share a highly distinctive feature in common, such as identical DNA or identical fingerprints, we can conclude beyond reasonable doubt that they must be the same person because of well-established scientific information that a particular structure of DNA and a particular fingerprint configuration occur in only one individual. However, when the points of similarity are less unique or distinctive, more similarities are required before the probability of identity between the two becomes convincing. A conclusion of identity cannot be made beyond a reasonable doubt unless experience, or statistics (if admissible), teach it is far more likely, given the similarities, that the two are the same person, than that they are two different people. The evidence must make it highly improbable that two different people are involved.

No such judgment can be made with any reasonable degree of confidence from two observations, eighteen years apart, of persons with the not-unusual name of Aaron Jackson, in a city with a population exceeding eight million. The government offered no evidence that the two Aaron Jacksons were of the same race, or of similar height, coloring, fingerprint configuration, or even general physical description. There was no showing of the previously convicted Aaron’s age. There was no showing that he was a resident of New York, much less that he lived at the same address as the defendant, or that the two shared any other significantly narrowing features. The jury had no reason to believe that the name Aaron Jackson is of sufficiently rare incidence in New York City to make it improbable that an individual of that name convicted in 1984 was the person now on trial before them eighteen years later.

The government however argued that a certificate attesting to the conviction of a person of the same name as the defendant should be sufficient by itself to prove the defendant’s prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, if the defendant offers no evidence in rebuttal.

But the court disagreed with the government.

The court reasoned that the burden of proof is on the government to prove the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Here is how the court explained its position:

The Court has recognized that the presumption of innocence requires that the accused be acquitted so long as the government has not proved every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, without any requirement that the accused offer evidence (or indeed lift a finger) in his defense. It is therefore a tenet of our criminal law that “[i]f the prosecution fails in its case-in-chief to present evidence establishing a prima facie case for conviction, the defense is entitled to a directed acquittal without the necessity of ever producing its own evidence.


Jackson’s conviction was reversed because the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the same person convicted of the firearm offense in 1984.

Share on facebook
Share on twitter
Share on linkedin
Share on email
Share on print
Share on reddit
Share on whatsapp
Share on pinterest
Share on pocket